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The bankruptcy courts' recent attempts to apply conflict of
laws principles to spendthrift trusts seem to substantiate the old
adage that bad facts produce bad law. Citing public policy
concerns, the bankruptcy courts in two recent decisions in this
area, In re Portnoy1 and In re Brooks,2 each applied the law of the
forum state, rather than that designated under the trust
instrument, in order to avoid finding that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" exempted a self-settled 3 spendthrift trust from

the bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2). 4

© 1999. All rights reserved.
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1.
Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
2.
A "self-settled" trust is one in which the settlor retains an interest as a
3.
beneficiary, even if it is only to receive distribution in the discretion of a trustee
(other than the settlor).
4.
See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 698-701; In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 10204. Although neither court specifically discusses 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), which
provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in
a trust that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law is enforceable in
a case under this title," it follows from each court's reasoning that neither wanted
to grant the debtor the relief afforded by that section through a finding that the
foreign law recited in the trust as controlling was the "applicable non-bankruptcy
law." Each court instead turned to the law of the forum to determine the trust's
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Although each of the debtors in Portnoy and Brooks appeared to

have created the trusts primarily to avoid creditors' claims s
neither the Portnoy court nor the Brooks court even attempted to
distinguish the substantial authority providing that a settlor's
designation of controlling law is generally to be respected by the
courts. 6 Although the results in Portnoy and Brooks may have
been appropriate to their immediate facts, the purported common
rationale for their holdings nevertheless does a disservice to the
generally thoughtful and considered body of law in this area.
These decisions set an unfortunately biased precedent for future
debtors who may be more deserving of relief. 7 This Article will
attempt to elucidate that broader body of conflict of laws
principles and to apply those principles to spendthrift trusts and
the Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) exemption in a more
objective manner than may have been possible under the

presumably egregious

factual backgrounds

of Portnoy and

Brooks.8

validity. By finding the trust to be invalid, the courts avoided the issue of
determining whether "applicable non-bankruptcy law" provided the spendthrift
protection afforded under section 541(c)(2).
5.
In its opening remarks, the Portnoy court stated that "[a]t the heart of
[Portwy] lies an irrevocable offshore trust into which [the debtor] placed virtually

all of his assets at a time when he knew that his personal guarantee of his
corporation's indebtedness was about to be called. The debtor... claims not only
that his assets have been successfully insulated under the law of the Jersey
Channel Islands... but that he is entitled as a matter of law to a discharge of all
debts including the indebtedness which he guaranteed." In re Portnoy, 201 B.R.
at 688.
Although the full factual background of Brooks is not set out in the court's
opinion, it is nevertheless easily inferred from the fact that the court twice
characterized the debtor's purported estate planning as a "scheme" that the court
considered the debtor to have acted in bad faith for reasons other than the pure
"estate planning" motives recited by the debtor. In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 102,
103.
6.
See generally In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697-700; In re Brooks, 217 B.R.
at 101-03.
7.
Although the authors believe that the courts in both Portnoy and
Brooks reached the correct result in denying the debtors their discharge, the same
result could presumably have been achieved using either a fraudulent transfer or
bad faith theory without resort to what the authors believe to be a novel (and
result driven) interpretation of conflict of laws principles.
8.
An even more recent bankruptcy case, In re Stephan Jay Lawrence,
227 B.R. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1998), which also deigned to apply the law of the forum
state rather than the law designated by the trust settlor under the trust
instrument, is not a focus of this Article since it does not consider the applicability
of the spendthrift trust exemption of Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) in light of
the conflict between the law of the forum (Florida) and that designated under the
trust instrument (Mauritius), but rather denied the debtor his discharge based
upon his "unrelenting campaign to conceal crucial information," and his "web of
deception." Id. at 911, 916.
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I.BACKGROUND
The conflict of laws issue in both Portnoy and Brooks seems

to have turned on a single defining feature: the settlors'
designation of the laws of "offshore" jurisdictions, specifically,
Bermuda and the Jersey Channel Islands, in an effort to obtain
spendthrift protections for the settlors' retained beneficial trust
interests at a time when the settlors were apparently experiencing
The settlors' decision to go
significant creditor problems. 9
offshore was presumably driven by the fact that at the time the
Portnoy and Brooks trusts were created, most domestic
jurisdictions (including the respective forum states) did not
permit a self-settled trust to effectively shield a settlor's retained
beneficial interest from her creditors. 1 0 This is in contrast to the
generally permissive state of domestic law permitting effective
restraints on the alienation of non-settlor beneficiaries' trust
interests. With respect to those interests, courts throughout the
United States have for the past hundred and twenty years applied
ejus est disponere," or "[w]hose it is to
the maxim "cujus est dare,
1
give, his it is to dispose."'
The Portnoy court chose the rule of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws section 270 to resolve the conflict between the
law of the Jersey Channel Islands and the law of the respective
forum state. 12 Section 270 provides that:
An inter vivos trust of interests in movables is valid if valid
(a) under the local law of the state designated by the settlor to
govern the validity of the trust, provided ... that the application of
its law does not violate a strong public policy of the state with
which, as to the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant
relationshipunder the principles stated in [RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF CONFLIcT OF LAws] § 6 ....

13

In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 697-99; In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 101-03.
9.
Although in Brooks it was actually the debtor's wife who settled the trust for the
debtor's benefit, she had received the subject property from the debtor just prior
to settlement and the court, therefore, held that she was, in fact, a mere nominee
of the debtor. In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 102-03.
10.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959). A notable, but
seemingly little used, exception existed at that.time under Missouri law. See Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 456.080 (West 1992). See also Estate of Uhl v. Commr., 241 F.2d 867
(7th Cir. 1957); Estate of German v. Commr., 7 Cl. Ct. 641 (1985), cases involving
federal estate tax matters but holding that certain self-settled trust protections
are afforded, respectively, under Indiana and Maryland law.
11.
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 378 (6th ed. 1990).
12.
See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 698.
13.

added).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971) (emphasis
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The Portnoy court also cited New York law, and recognized that,
under this law, "to render foreign law unenforceable as contrary
to public policy, it must violate some fundamental principal of
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, or some deeprooted tradition of the common weal." 14
The Portnoy and Brooks courts then discussed precedent that
held self-settled spendthrift trusts to be contrary to public policy
under the law of their respective forum states.1 5 Each court thus
determined to decide whether the trust was valid using the

subjective criteria set forth in section 6 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws which provides that "[a] court,
subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law," or, if none, the court
should determine choice of law based on
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(fQ
(g)

the needs of the interstate and international systems,
the relevant policies of the forum,
the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
the protection of justified expectations,
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
ease in the determination and application of the law to be
16
applied.

Under this analysis, the courts in both cases held that the
domestic jurisdiction had a greater interest in the matter at issue
than did the foreign jurisdiction.1 7 The blanket rule that may be

14.
In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 700 (citing 19 N.Y. Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws
§ 14, at 586-87 (1982)).
15.
In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 700; In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 103-04.
16.
RMATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 6.
17.
See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 698; In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 101.
However, the Brooks court decided to apply the law of the forum state by simple
reference to the Connecticut Superior Court's opinion in Stetson v. Morgan

Guaranty Trust Company of New Yorlk 164 A.2d 239 (1960) rather than pursuant
to a true analysis under section 6 of the Restatement. In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at
101. Specifically, the Brooks court, citing Stetson, stated that, OConnecticut courts
have held that '... the legality of the trust of personalty [is determined] by the law
of the settlor's domicil ...

.. Id. The court, therefore, looked only to the settlor's

Connecticut residency to hold that Connecticut law trumped the law of the Jersey
Channel Islands. See id. at 103-04.
Interestingly, the full quote from the Stetson opinion provides a very different
import than the one set forth by the Brooks court:
While in general the validity of a trust of realty has been determined by the
law of the situs of the land and the legality of the trust of personalty by the
law of the settlor's domicil, there are many opportunities for complications
and variations. Among other considerations, the courts are influenced by
the nature of the property involved and its location; the domicil of the
settlor and the trustee; the situs of the trust administration and whether
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distilled from these cases seems to be that, unlike with other

spendthrift trusts, public policy acts as an absolute bar to an
individual's right to create an effective self-settled spendthrift
trust unless the law of the forum state permits such trusts.
II. DIscussioN

Putting aside the subjective consideration of public policy,
the law is well established that a settlor's designation of
controlling law governs the administration of a trust, including
the efficacy of a trust's spendthrift provision:
If the settlor creates a trust to be administered in a state other
than that of his domicil, the law of the state of the place of
administration, rather than that of his domicil, ordinarily is
applicable. Thus a settlor domiciled in one state may create an
inter vivos trust by conveying property to a trust company of
another state as trustee and delivering the property to it to be
administered in that state. In that case the law of that state will be
applicable as to the rights of creditors to reach the beneficiary's
interest.
This permits a person who is domiciled in a state in which
restraints on alienation are not permitted, to create an inter vivos
trust in another state where they are permitted and thereby take
advantage of the law of the latter state.lB

In fact, in some jurisdictions a settlor's ability to designate the
law of a particular jurisdiction as the governing law of the trust is
expressly provided by statute. For example, section 7-1.10 of the

New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law provides that
"[wihenever a person, not domiciled in this state, creates a trust
which provides that it shall be governed by the laws of this state,
such provision shall be given effect in determining the validity,
effect and interpretation of the disposition in such trust .. - 9
Interpreting a prior version of this statute, the New York Court of
Appeals in Hutchinson v. Ross stated that "[tihe statute makes [a
settlor's] express declaration of intention [of controlling law]
conclusive .. .."20 A New York court also noted that "[ilt cannot
be doubted

.

. . that this state encourages the selection by

the question is the legality of the act of trust creation or the rule governing
trust administration. There is a tendency to respect the expressed will of
the settloras to the controlling law.
Stetson, 164 A.2d at 240 (emphasis added) (citing 1A Bogert, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§ 211).
18.
5A ASTON W. ScOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 626, at
419 (4th ed. 1989).
19.
N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 7-1. 10 (McKinney 1992).
20.
Hutchinson v. Ross, 187 N.E. 65, 71 (N.Y. 1933).
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residents of other states of New York as the situs of trusts. "21
Although the primafacie ability of a domiciliary settlor to create a
valid trust governed by the laws of a foreign jurisdiction is not
expressly conferred by statute, it is either set forth under existing
case law or can be logically inferred.2 2 A strong argument can
also be made that principles of judicial comity require that a
settlor's designation of controlling law be respected by the
23
courts.

The apparent conflict over the import of section 270 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, as set forth in Portnoy
and Brooks and the foregoing authorities is a result of the fact
that section 270 is specific to the validity of a trust rather than
the efficacy of a purported restraint on alienation of beneficial
trust interests. With regard to the conflict of laws issue on this
latter matter, section 273 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws is the applicable authority. Section 273 provides that:
Whether the interest of a beneficiary of [an inter-vivos] trust of
movables is assignable by him and can be reached by his creditors
is determined
...by the local law of the state, if any, in which the settlor has
manifested an intention that the trust is to be administered, and
otherwise by the local law of the state to which the administration
24
of the trust is most substantially related.

The express public policy caveat of section 270 is neither
repeated in section 273 nor in the official comment.25 The
absence of such a caveat raises the question of whether public
policy is an appropriate basis for effectively overturning a settlor's
designation of controlling law when the issue is the alienation of
spendthrift trust interests rather than the general validity of the
21

In re Accounting of New York Trust Co., 87 N.Y.S.2d 787, 792 (N.Y.

Sup. ct. 1949). For other laws supporting a settlor's right to determine the law
applicable to a trust see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-1-1 to 18-1-4 (1997); Convention on
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, Oct. 8, 1984, art.6
reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1389, 1389 (1984). ("A trust shall be governed by the law
chosen by the settlor.").
22.
See, e.g., In re New York Trust Co., 87 N.Y.S.2d at 792 ("It is
inconceivable that a state committed to [the policy of ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS
LAW § 7-1.10) would deny its own residents the corresponding right to establish
trusts in other states.... [U]nder the law of this state, a New York resident may
choose another state as the situs of a trust as freely as a non-resident may create
a trust in New York.").
23.
See generally 17 C.J.S. § 12(1).
24.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 273 (1971).
25.
Compare id. § 270 (stating that the settlor's designation of the law
governing the trust is only valid if not contrary to a "strong public policy" of the
state whose laws would ordinarily govern the trust) uith it § 273 and cmt. d
(stating that an inter vivos trust and whether it can be reached by creditors will be
governed by the laws of the state designated by the settlor).
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trust. Although it cannot be denied that public policy concerns
underlie the application of all conflict of laws principles, the
express public policy provision in section 270 makes its absence
from section 273 conspicuous and suggestive of a relatively low
importance vis A vis the application of conflict of laws principles
to spendthrift trusts.
Indeed, even the Portnoy and Brooks courts acknowledged
26
that a settlor may generally specify the trust's controlling law.
For this reason, each court most likely misconstrued the question
before it as one of validity under section 270, rather than
administration and efficacy of the spendthrift provision under
section 273.
Moreover, even under section 270, each court
simply chose to assume the premise that it wished to prove; that
is, the law of the forum should govern because it provides that
self-settled trusts are void as to the settlor's creditors. 2 7 Such
reasoning, however, constitutes an obvious nonsequitur.
Although application of the foreign law may, arguendo, have
violated a strong public policy of the forum, such a finding cannot
deliver the courts' desired result unless it is also the case that "as
to the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant
28
relationship" to the forum.
On this latter point, although the principles set forth in
section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, recited
above, are quite general, it seems questionable whether, as to the
matter at issue, the Portnoy and Brooks trusts would have their
most significant relationship with the forum state. This issue
would most likely turn on the location of the primary
administration of the trust.29 For example, a trust designates the

law of the Jersey Channel Islands as controlling, and the trustee
resides in the Jersey Channel Islands with the vast majority of
trust transactions taking place in the Jersey Channel Islands, but
the trust settlor is a resident somewhere in the United States. It
would appear that a domestic creditor, with a cause of action
against the trust settlor, would be hard pressed to argue that the
United States has a more significant relationship with the trust
as to that cause of action than the Jersey Channel Islands. Aside

26.
See Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 697
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1998).
27.
See In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 700; In re Brooks, 217 B.R. at 102.
28.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270.
It is interesting to note that for federal tax purposes, whether a trust is
29.
deemed domestic (i.e., U.S.) or foreign turns upon whether a domestic court is
able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust and
whether domestic trustees control all substantial decisions effecting the trust.
See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(30)(E)(i).
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from the cases dealing with self-settled trusts, there seems to be
no authority suggesting that a court cannot apply the law
declared
by the
trust settlor simply because
the
debtor/beneficiary resides in the forum state.3 0 Although the
public policy concerns of the forum state may well differ when the
trust is self-settled, focusing on self-settlement begs the
applicable question: "as to the matter at issue," which state has
the most significant relationship to the trust?
Moreover, in contrast to the implication of Portnoy and
Brooks, the fact that the forum state does not permit self-settled
spendthrift trusts to be created under its own law does not
necessarily mean that it would violate a strongpublic policy of the
forum state to recognize a self-settled spendthrift trust if it was
validly created under the law of a foreign jurisdiction. In fact,
[ilt would seem that the policy of a state, whether it be to restrain
alienation in order to protect the beneficiary, or to permit alienation
in order to protect creditors and assignees, is not so strong as to
preclude the application of the law to the contrary prevailing in
31
another state.

Although not dealing with the efficacy of a restraint on the
alienation of a self-settled spendthrift trust interest, the Fifth
Circuit has stated that:
Mere difference between the law of the forum and that of the

foreign State does not of itself prevent enforcement of the foreign
law or rights based thereon if such law is not against the public
policy of the forum. The fact, therefore, that under Florida law the
trust agreement is presumptively void does not prevent a Florida
court from applying the law of Minnesota, where the agreement was
made and under which law the agreement is presumptively valid.
Such difference in the law of Florida and that of Minnesota does
not of itself prevent enforcement in Florida of the Minnesota
contract and the rights based thereon, since the difference is not
32
contrary to the prohibitory law of that forum.

In addition, in every case where the enforcement of the law of
another jurisdiction appears contrary to the public policy of the

30.
See, e.g., Subranni v. Remington (In re Remington), 14 B.R. 496, 502
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (stating that the validity of a trust's spendthrift protection is
determined by the law of the trust's situs, rather than law of the bankrupt
beneficiary's domicile); see also Togut v. Hecht (In re Hecht), 54 B.R. 379 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985), affid 69 B.R. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Accounting of New York
Trust Co., 87 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949).
31.
Scorr FRATCHER, supranote 18, § 626, at 414.
32.
Warner v. Florida Bank and Trust Co. 160 F.2d 766, 772 (5th Cir.
1947). See also Surman v. Fitzgerald (In re Fitzgerald), 1 Ch. 573 (1904), rev'g 1
Ch. 933 (1903) (stating that although restraints on the alienation of beneficial
trust interests are not permitted under English law, they are not so far contrary to
public policy as to preclude the English courts from enforcing them in trusts
validly created under Scottish law).
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forum state, principles of judicial comity provide a
counterbalancing public policy that the validity of the law of such
other jurisdiction be enforced.3a
There are also a number of cases that have applied conflicts
of law principles to spendthrift trusts without resort to public
policy. For example, though not considered in either the Portnoy
or Brooks opinions, the bankruptcy court's decision in Togut v.
Hecht seems to provide direct precedent for both cases.3 4 At
issue in Togut was "whether the laws of the State of Maryland or
New York are applicable in determining the validity of the
spendthrift trust provisions ... .",
In Togut, the debtor argued
for the application of Maryland law, because it would preclude
the bankruptcy trustee from claiming any portion of the
spendthrift trust's undistributed income and principal as a part
of the bankruptcy estate.3 6 The bankruptcy trustee argued that
the law of the forum state of New York should apply, because
under the law of New York, the bankruptcy trustee would be
entitled to ten percent of the trust's undistributed income as well
as any portion of the remaining ninety percent of such income
that might be in excess of the debtor's reasonable living
requirements.3 7 The bankruptcy court's determination that the
law of Maryland was the "applicable non-bankruptcy law" for
purposes of determining the Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2)
exemption3s was based solely upon the trust settlor's designation
of Maryland law as the law governing "all questions pertaining to
[the trust's] validity, construction and administration." 3 9 The
court apparently did not consider the possibility that the
application of the more broadly based Maryland spendthrift laws
might offend the public policy concerns of the bankruptcy court's
forum of New York. The bankruptcy court's decision in Togut is,
therefore, difficult to reconcile with Portnoy and Brooks, as all
three cases dealt with the application of conflict of laws principles
to the spendthrift trust exemption under section 541(c)(2). 4 0 It is

33.
Comity is granted "not as a matter of obligation but out of deference
and mutual respect." See, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695
(Az. Ct. App. 1977). The extension of comity, therefore, anticipates a reciprocal
grant.
34.
See generaly Togut v. Hecht (In re Hecht), 54 B.R. 379 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1985).
35.

Id. at 381.

36.

Id.

37.
See id.
38.
See id at 382.
39.
Id. at 381.
40.
See Togut v. Hecht (In re Hecht), 54 B.R. 379, 382; Marine Midland
Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). Cf.
Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 101-03 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). A
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especially difficult to reconcile Portnoy and Togut since both cases
were decided in a New York forum that presumably had the same
public policy in Portnoy that it did a mere nine years earlier in
Togut.
Of the cases outside the bankruptcy area concerning the
application of conflict of laws principles to spendthrift trusts, many
respect the settlor's express designation of controlling law,
notwithstanding that such a result seems to frustrate public policy
concerns at least as important as the protection of creditors' rights.
Most telling, perhaps, are those cases that deal either with a spousal
right of election or the rights of parties in marital contests, as both
types of cases implicate a substantial public policy recognized in all
states. For example, in The National Shawnut Bank of Boston v.
Cumming,41 the settlor, a domiciliary of Vermont, created a trust of
"the greater part of his property," which trust the settlor designated to
be "construed and the provisions thereof interpreted under and in
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." 42
As recognized by the lower court's opinion, the Shaumut settlor's
clearly implied intent in designating Massachusetts law as controlling
was to defeat his surviving spouse's significantly greater inheritance
rights under Vermont law.4 According to the Shaumut court:
[i]f the settlor had been domiciled in this Commonwealth and had

transferred here personal property here to a trustee here for
administration here, the transfer would have been valid even if his
sole purpose had been to deprive his wife of any portion of it. The
Vermont law we understand to be otherwise and to invalidate a
transfer made there by one domiciled there of personal property
there, if made with an actual, as distinguished from an implied,
44
fraudulent intent to disinherit his spouse.

In holding that Massachusetts law should apply, thereby
depriving the surviving spouse of the greater part of her
inheritance rights, the Shawmut court stated that "[tihe general
tendency of authorities elsewhere is away from the adoption of
the law of the settlor's domicil where the property, the domicil

distinction between Togut, and Portnoyand Brooks, is that the Togut trust was not
self-settled. In re Hecht, 54 B.R. at 381. However, if self-settlement is a valid
ground for disregarding the settlor's declaration of governing law (as opposed to
the public policy considerations applicable to the differing disabling restraints
underlying that declaration), no court has yet proffered such a justification and, at
best, it seems questionable whether such a distinction could be persuasively
presented.
91 N.E.2d 337 (Mass. 1950).
41.
Id. at 339.
42.
See id.
43.
Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
44.
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and place of business of the trustee, and the place of
administration intended by the settlor are in another State."45
If the courts, nevertheless, insist upon a general public policy
review whenever a self-settled spendthrift trust comes within
their purview, their natural impulse towards automatic reliance
on precedent must be tempered by recognition that our society
has changed significantly since the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws took its snap-shot of the law more than forty
years ago. It is a truism that notions of public policy are not
static, but vary with time and place, and courts are obliged to
revisit public policy if they choose to cite to it as a judicial check
against otherwise permissible estate and asset protection
planning opportunities. In this regard, it was not until the United
States Supreme Court decided Nichols v. Eaton s in 1875 that the
general validity of spendthrift trusts, which today we take for
granted in this country, was first recognized throughout the
United States. In Nichols the court broke with a long tradition of
English common law on spendthrift trusts, which to this day
invalidates spendthrift trust protections in that country:
We concede that there are limitations which public policy or
general statutes impose upon all dispositions of property, such as
those designed to prevent perpetuities and accumulations of real
estate ....
We also admit that there is a just and sound policy...
to protect creditors against frauds upon their rights ....
But the
doctrine, that the owner of property... cannot so dispose of it, but
that the object of his bounty ... must hold it subject to the debts
due his creditors... is one which we are not prepared to announce
47

as the doctrine of this court.

Another example of the vagaries of public policy over time is the
recent spate of legislative negation of the Rule Against Perpetuities
in this country. When Nichols v. Eaton was decided in 1875, the
Rule Against Perpetuities was viewed as a necessary limitation on
potential restraints on the alienability of property. Today, eight
states have repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities and a number of
additional states are considering such changes. 48 Therefore, while
on the one hand it can be argued there has been an erosion of the
protections offered by spendthrift trusts in this country, 49 on the

45.
Id. at 341.
46.
91 U.S. 716 (1875).
47.
Id. at 725.
48.
To date, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin have repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities.
49.
While certain classes of creditors have always been able to reach
spendthrift trusts under state law (e.g., alimony and child support creditors and
tax creditors), recently at least one tort creditor has also been able to do so. See
The Mississippi
Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 So.2d 1020 (Miss. 1997).
legislature, however, promptly acted to negate a Sligh-like result in future cases
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other hand it can be said that spendthrift trusf protections are

expanding.50 In the aggregate, these developments simply evidence
the public policy pendulum swinging in different directions in
response to the social and economic needs of our changing society.
Bankruptcy courts, however, have failed to take judicial
notice of the recent trend of domestic jurisdictions to validate
self-settled spendthrift trusts, both legislatively and judicially,
provided the circumstances surrounding settlement are not
deemed inequitable. 5 '
In addition, although it cannot be considered part of this
recent trend since it was initially enacted in 1861, in line with the
foregoing is Colorado Revised Statutes section 38-10-111, which
provides that "[all deeds of gift, all conveyances, and all transfers
or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or things in
action, or real property, made in trust for the use of the person
making the same shall be void as against the creditors existing of
such person/ 5 2 Caselaw has settled this statute's obvious logical
interpretation that as to future creditors, a self-settled Colorado
spendthrift trust will be effective to protect the settlor's retained
53
beneficial interest.
Even New York, where the Portnoy court found the notion of
a self-settled spendthrift trust to be offensive, has taken a step
towards the recognition of such trusts under the appropriate
circumstances. In Matter of Heller, an apparent case of first
impression, the New York Surrogate's Court permitted the
severance of "an irrevocable inter-vivos trust into two trusts for

the novel purpose of insulating the trust's substantial cash and
securities from potential creditor's claims that could arise from
the trust's real property."5 4 The severance of the trust into two
portions, in effect, caused the creation of a self-settled spendthrift
trust vis A vis the existing trust. In allowing this self-settled

through the "Family Trust Preservation Act of 1998." MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-9501, et seq.
50.
For example, pension plans and other retirement plans enjoy creditor
protection under ERISA and a majority of state statutes (notwithstanding the fact
that they are analogous to self-settled trusts). See, e.g., Gideon Rothschild &
Christopher Alliots, ProtectingRetirement Plans, J. AssET PROTEcTION, March/April
1997, at 35. More recently some states have exempted trusts funded with
structured settlements from the claims of creditors.
51.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a) (Lexis 1998) (effective Apr. 2,
1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3571-76 (Supp. 1998) (effective July 1, 1997).
See also H.R. 1553, 76th Leg., (Tex.) (introduced Feb. 17, 1999), available in
WESTLAW, TX-BILLS Database (which, if enacted, would permit self-settled
spendthrift trusts in Texas).
52.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-111 (1997) (emphasis added).
53.
See, e.g., Connolly v. Baum (In re Baum), 22 F.3d 1014, 1017 (10th Cir.
1994).
54.
In re Application of Heller, 613 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1994).
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spendthrift trust to be created, the Heller court rightfully
acknowledged that
New York law recognizes the right of individuals to arrange their
affairs so as to limit their liability to creditors, including the holding
of assets in corporate form, making irrevocable transfers of their
assets, outright or in trust, as long as such transfers are not in
fraud of existing creditors, establishing spendthrift trusts to protect
the assets from the beneficiary's creditors and renouncing property
55
interests that otherwise would be subject to creditors claims.

The Heller court was apparently unconcerned with the effect of its
ruling on the trust's creditors since the "trustee expressly
represent[ed] that there [were] no current claims and none
" 56
threatened or reasonably anticipated.

In the above-mentioned statutory schemes, as well as in
Heller, an effective balance is struck between the right to create a
self-settled spendthrift trust and the rights of existing creditors to
reach into those trusts to satisfy their claims if the funding of the

trusts constitutes a fraudulent conveyance. 5 7 As such, the public
policy concerns of the courts of other jurisdictions adjudicating
the validity thereof should not be implicated, and self-settled
trusts should not be regarded any differently from spendthrift
In the form of fraudulent
trusts that are not self-settled.
conveyance legislation, every jurisdiction already has a built-in
protection against the evil perceived by the Portnoy and Brooks
courts that negates the need for a blanket rule vitiating the

efficacy of spendthrift trusts validly created under the law of
Therefore, public policy need not be
other jurisdictions.5 s
offended by the legitimate use of self-settled spendthrift trusts in
estate and/or asset protection planning, but should only be

Id. (citations omitted).
55.
Id. By analogy, the recent enactment in every state of limited liability
56.
company legislation evidences an individual's right to shelter herself from liability
arising from her business activities. It is also common to find business entities
segregating their asset holdings by forming subsidiary structures to protect
themselves from unforeseen liabilities.
57.
For example, an Alaska self-settled spendthrift trust is ineffective if the
transfer to the trust is considered a fraudulent transfer under Alaska law or if at
the time of the transfer the settlor is in default of making child support payments.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Lexis 1998). A Delaware self-settled spendthrift
trust is ineffective as against an even broader class of creditors. DEL. CODE ANN.
fit. 12, § 3573 (Supp. 1998).
58.
See, e.g., N.Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 270-81 (McKinney 1990). Of
particular significance is the distinction between "present" and "future" creditors

and the differing circumstances under which a conveyance of property will be
deemed a fraudulent conveyance as to each such class of creditors. Compare id.
§ 278 (stating that creditors whose claims have matured can set aside fraudulent
conveyances in any complicit purchase or purchase for less than fair value) with
id. § 279 (stating that creditors without mature claims must seek relief from the
court and the court may set aside a conveyance, or stop a disposition of property).
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offended by its abuse as determined by violation of applicable
fraudulent conveyance law. 5 9 In this respect, legislation
permitting the creation of a self-settled spendthrift trust is no
different from a host of other legitimate planning opportunities,
such as the use of ERISA qualified plans, individual retirement
accounts, or life insurance or annuity exemptions, to shelter
assets from the reach of creditors, while at the same time
retaining almost complete control over such assets as well as the
sole benefit thereof.60 Moreover, even when such planning
opportunities are used for the sole purpose of shielding otherwise
non-exempt assets from the claims of existing creditors, courts
have generally recognized such planning as acceptable. 6 1
That the law allows a person to limit her exposure to
creditors should come as no surprise to anyone, and voluntary
creditors, at least, should not be heard to complain since they are

presumed to know the extent to which the law will permit them to
enforce their claims.
It is believed that every State in the Union has passed statutes by
which a part of the property of the debtor is exempt from seizure on
execution or other process of the courts; in short, is not by law
liable to the payment of his debts ......
This has come to be
considered in this country as a wise, as it certainly may be called a
settled, policy in all the States. To property so exempted the
creditor has no right to look, and does not look, as a means of
payment when his debt is created; and while this court has steadily
held, under the constitutional provision against impairing the
obligations of contracts by State laws, that such exemption laws,
when first enacted, were invalid as to debts then in existence, it

59.
For an overview of the unique estate planning benefit of Alaska (and by
extension, Delaware and "offshore" self-settled spendthrift trusts), see Gideon
Rothschild, Coming in from the Cold-Estate Planning Using Alaska Trusts, in 3
CCH FINANCIAL AND ESTATE PLANNING 31,831 (Sidney Kess & Bertil Westin eds.
1997); Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, A New Directionin Estate
Planning:North to Alaska, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Sept. 1997, at 48.
60.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 361-62 (1978) for the legislative history
underlying the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
61.
See, e.g., In re Mart, 88 B.R. 436, 438 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). The
judge in Mart stated that:
I agree that [the] statutory exemption [for annuities], perhaps like all
exemptions, invites abuse. I also agree that the debtor's relationship with
the . . . trustee, her evident willingness to accept her father's proposals,
and the fact that this is a completely private arrangement are grounds for
careful scrutiny.
I reject the argument and the objections, however, because... I find no
intent to defraud creditors in this debtor's conversion of his non-exempt
assets to exempt assets through the establishment of this annuity
contract.

Id. See also Rothschild &Alliotts, supranote 50, at 35.
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has always held, that, as to contracts made thereafter,
62
exemptions were valid.

the

Thus, the Supreme Court distinguished between existing and
future creditors, based upon "sound and unanswerable reason,"

since the future creditor
is neither defrauded nor injured by the application of the law to his
case, as he knows, when he parts with the consideration of his
debt, that the property so exempt can never be made liable to its
payment. Nothing is withdrawn from this liability which was ever
subject to it, or to which he had a right to look for its discharge in
payment. 63

Therefore, if the public policy basis for voiding self-settled
spendthrift trusts is based upon an equitable creditors' fights
argument, the question must be asked whether the equities are
not somewhat distorted by a creditor who chose, in the pursuit of
profit, to extend credit based upon exempt assets. Therefore, if it
is accurate to state that the real concern is that a debtor will be
able to obtain unfair advantage over existing creditors through
the use of a self-settled spendthrift trust, the appropriate remedy
would be the imposition of sufficient sanctions, whether they be
penal or merely pecuniary, to deter those who would otherwise
engage in fraudulent conveyances through vehicles that negate
the practical risk of transferee liability.
Finally, some consideration must also be afforded to our
obvious public policy goal of keeping trust capital (and trust
business) within the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
of the U.S. judicial system and the Internal Revenue Service. In
this respect, although the Portnoy and Brooks courts denied their
respective debtors a discharge in bankruptcy, for all intents and
purposes, the assets that had been transferred to offshore
fiduciaries will most likely remain unavailable to the debtors'
domestic creditors and the Internal Revenue Service. Therefore, a

blanket conflict of laws rule that, in the guise of public policy,
refuses to validate self-settled spendthrift trusts under the
appropriate circumstances will serve only to ensure the
continuing flight of trust capital to foreign jurisdictions where the

determination of a domestic court will have no practical effect. In
contrast, a rule respecting the vast majority of self-settled
spendthrift trusts, which do not defraud the settlor's existing
creditors, will put domestic jurisdictions such as Alaska,
Colorado, Delaware, and Missouri on par with offshore
jurisdictions for legitimate trust business.

62.
63.

Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875).
Id.

778

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:763

III. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate, but perhaps not terribly surprising, that
the first two reported cases to consider the application of conflict

of laws principles to self-settled spendthrift trusts both involved

"bad facts" from an asset protection planning standpoint. In this
regard, the adage "bad facts produce bad law" is not a slight on
the courts, but rather an acknowledgment of a court's primary

duty to do substantial justice to the parties immediately before it.
However, in an effort to do substantial justice to the parties
immediately before them, the Portnoy and Brooks courts have

forged what may well become the first two links in an overly stiff
and unyielding chain of precedent upon which future courts will
rely without due analysis of the conflict of laws issue.64 " We do

not suggest that debtors are bereft of any moral obligation to
creditors, nor that the courts should countenance fraudulent
conveyances simply because they may be valid under the law of
another jurisdiction. We suggest instead that there must be a
balancing of interests recognizing that our society continues to

evolve, and that our common law must do so as well. In
summary, a self-settled spendthrift trust, if valid under the law of
a sister state, or even the law of a foreign state, should be
respected if created for legitimate estate or asset protection
planning purposes but should provide no spendthrift protection if
not.

64.
An example of which is In re Lawrence, wherein the entirety of the
court's analysis as to the conflict of laws between the forum state of Florida and
the trust's designated law of Mauritius is a statement that "[t]his Court is
persuaded by the decisions of Portnoy, Brooks and Cameron. The Debtor's rights
and obligations under the Mauritian Trust are governed by Florida and federal
bankruptcy law, which have an overriding interest in the trust, and not the law of
the Republic of Mauritius." Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence), 227 B.R. 907,
917 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).
It is curious, however, that the court was persuaded by the decision of In re
Cameron as to the conflict of laws issue since (i) that case accepted the trust's
designated law of New York as controlling, and since (ii) there could necessarily be
no conflict of laws issue because neither the designated law nor the law of the
forum state permitted self-settled spendthrift trusts. Dzikowski v. Edmonds (In re
Cameron), 223 B.R. 20, 22-25 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).

